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Abstract. This paper describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in
an economy with non-convex private- and public-sector employment. In contrast to
Vasilev 2017, 2015, the public-sector labor supply decision is a sequential one. This
requires two separate insurance market to operate, one for private-sector work, and
one for public-sector employment. In addition, given that the labor choice for private-
and public-sector hours is made in succession, the insurance market for public emloy-
ment needs to open once the other insurance market has closed. This segmentation
and sequentiality of insurance markets operation is a new result in the literature and
a direct consequence of the double non-convexity, and the sequential nature of the
sectoral labor supply decision.
Keywords: Indivisible Labor, Public Employment, Sequential Lotteries, Insurance.
JEL Classification: E1, J22, J45.
1. Introduction
This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply decisions in an
economy with both private and public sector jobs. In contrast to Vasilev 2017, the
sectoral labor choice is made in a sequential manner. In contrast to this earlier study,
the focus of the present note falls on the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium
for the setup in Vasilev 2017.1 The main result is that in the presence of non-convex
1In an separate line of research, Vasilev 2016 extends Hansen and Sargent 1988 with a
sequential overtime decision More specifically, the problem is one of two-stage non-convex
labor supply decisions in an economy where agents first decide whether to participate in
the labor market or stay unemployed, and then, conditional on being hired, need to decide
whether they will work only the full-time equivalent, or engage in overtime hours. We follow
this aproach here with the sequential labor choice as well.
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labor supply for both private- and public-sector employment, and when the public
sector labor decision is assumed to be sequential, the setup requires two separate
insurance market to operate, one for private sector work, and one for public sector
employment. In addition, given that the sectoral labor choice is made in succession,
the insurance market for public-sector hours needs to open only after the insurance
market for private-sector employment has already closed. This sequentiality of insur-
ance markets operation is a new result in the literature and a direct consequence of
the sequential nature of the sectoral labor decision.
2. Model Setup
The theoretical setup follows to a great extent Vasilev 2017, 2015, except for
the timing of the sectoral labor suply decisions. The economy is static, there is no
physical capital, and agents face a sequential non-convex decision in a two-sector
economy.2 Since the focus is on a one-period world, the model abstracts away from
technological progress, population growth and uncertainty. There is a large number
of identical one-member households, indexed by i and distributed uniformly on the
[0, 1] interval. In the exposition below, we will use small case letters to denote indi-
vidual variables and suppress the index i to save on notation.
2.1 Households
Each household solves the following optimization problem:
max
(c,S,hp,hg)∈K
ln[cη + Sη]
1
η + α ln(1− hp − hg) (1)
where c, S, hp, hg denote private consumption, consumption of the public good, hours
worked in the private sector, and hours worked in the government sector and their
quadruples (c, S, hp, hg) belong to a feasible fixed compact subset K of the space R4.
The parameter
α > 1
measures the relative weight of leisure in the utility function. Total consumption is
a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregation of private consumption and
consumption of government services, where
η > 0
measures the degree of substitutability between private and public consumption.3
2Adding physical capital accumulation decision, and a dynamic structure to the model
is then straightforward. Also, the absence of those elements in the current analysis does
not affect in any major way the derivation of the optimality conditions characterizing the
aggregate labor supply decisions.
3The separability of consumption and leisure is not a crucial assumption for the results
that follow. A more general, non-separable, utility representation, does not generate new
results, while significantly complicates the algebraic derivations, and thus interferes with
model tractability.
20
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Each household is endowed with 1 unit of time that can be allocated to work
in the private sector, work in the government sector, or leisure
hp + hg + l = 1. (2)
Labor supply in each sector is assumed to be discrete
hp ∈ {0, h¯p}, hg ∈ {0, h¯g}.
In contrast to Vasilev 2017, within the period, each household decides first to look
for a job in the private sector, and if unsuccessful, will search for work in the public
sector. The wage rate per hour worked in the private and public sectors is wp and
wg, respectively.
In addition to labor income income, households hold shares in the private firm
and receives an equal profit share pi, with∫ 1
0
pidi = Π.4
Income is subject to a (equal) lump-sum tax t, where∫ 1
0
tdi = T,
with T denoting aggregate tax revenue. Therefore, each household’s budget constraint
is
cj ≤ wjhj + pi − t, with j = p, g. (3)
Households act competitively by taking the wage rates
{wp, wg},
aggregate outcomes
{C, S,Hp, Hg}
and lump-sum taxes {T} as given. Each household chooses
(cj , hp, hg)
to maximize the function
U(c, hp, hg) = ln[cη + Sη]
1
η + α ln(1− hp − hg),
upon the constraints given by 2 and 3.
4This technical assumption guarantees a positive consumption to either of the two types,
even if they choose not to work in their sector.
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3. Firms
There is a representative firm in the private sector producing a homogeneous
final consumption good, which uses labor as an only input. The production function
is given by
Y = F (Hp), F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0, F ′(H¯p) = 0, (4)
where the last assumption is imposed to proxy a capacity constraint. The firm acts
competitively by taking the hourly wage rate
{wp},
aggregate outcomes
{C, S,Hg}
and policy variable
{T}
as given. Accordingly, {Hp} is chosen to maximize static aggregate profit:5
max
Hp≥0
F (Hp)− wpHp. (5)
Given the assumption imposed on the production function, in equilibrium, the firm
will realize positive economic profit.
4. Government
The government hires employees to provide public services and levies lum-sum
taxes on households to finance the government wage bill. The technology of the public
good provision uses labor Hg as an input, which is remunerated at a non-competitive
wage rate
wg = γwp.
Parameter γ ≥ 1 will measure the fixed gross mark-up of government sector wage
rate over the private sector one.6. The production function of public services is as
follows:
S = S(Hg), S′ > 0, S′′ < 0, S′(H¯g) = 0, (6)
where the last assumption states that due to a capacity constraint, not everyone can
work in the production of the public good.
The government runs a balanced budget: The public sector wage bill is financed
by levying a lump-sum tax T on all households
wgHg = T. (7)
5This representation can be viewed as being isomorphic to a problem in which capital has
already been optimized over.
6Such a mark-up is a stylized fact for the major EU economies, e.g. Vasilev 2015
22
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In terms of fiscal instruments available at the government’s disposal, the government
takes total public sector hours, Hg, as given, and sets the public sector wage rate, wg,
as a fixed gross mark-up above the competitive wage rate. T will be then residually
chosen to guarantee that the budget is balanced.
4.1 Insurance Markets
Alternatively, we could regard the labor selection arrangement as follows: the
workers are participating in a compound (two-stage) lottery with the proportions
representing the probability of being selected for work. Conditional on the sequential
labor choice, a household would receive the same income in expected terms. Lastly,
we can introduce insurance markets, and allow households to buy insurance, which
would allow them to equalize the actual income received. Given the observed dif-
ference in the private- and public-sector wages, and the sequential nature of sectoral
non-convex labor supply decision, sequential and segmented insurance markets are
also needed in order to provide actuarially fair insurance.
There is one representative insurance company for private sector employment,
and one for public sector hours. The two companies are segmented and operate in
sequence. At the beginning of each period, the households decide if and how much in-
surance to buy against the probability of being chosen for private-sector work. Then,
the company closes, and the insurance company for public-sector work opens. In
both cases insurance costs qj per unit, j = p, g, and provides one unit of income if
the household is not working. We can think of insurance as bonds that pay out only
in case the household is not chosen for work. Thus, household will also choose the
quantity of insurance to purchase bj , j = p, g. This setup requires that the overtime
insurance company insures workers who have already been selected for work in the
first stage. In this sense, the insurance markets are segmented as well. Without the
segmented and sequential nature of the insurance markets described above, insurance
will not be actuarially fair, one of the groups will face better odds versus price, the
company will not be able to break even, and/or at least one type of households will
not be able to buy full insurance, which would completely smooth consumption across
employment states, given the non-convexity constraint of labor supply.
4.1.1 Private-Sector Insurance company. The insurance company for straight
time maximizes profit. The company services all households. It receives revenue if a
household is working and makes payment if it is not. More specifically, the propor-
tion of people working in the private sector contribute towards the unemployment
benefits pool, which are then distributed of benefits to the unemployed. The amount
of insurance sold is a solution to the following problem.
Taking qp(i) as given, bp(i) solves
max
bp(i)
λp(i)qp(i)bp(i)− [1− λp(i)]bp(i). (8)
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With free entry profits are zero, hence
λp(i)qp(i)bp(i)− [1− λp(i)]bp(i) = 0. (9)
This condition implicitly clears the insurance market for each household.
4.1.2 Public-sector insurance company. The insurance company for public sector
employment maximizes profit as well. The company opens once the other insurance
company has already closed, and services only the households that have been not been
selected for private-sector work in the first stage. It receives revenue if a household is
working in the ublic sector, and makes payment if it is not. More specifically, the pro-
portion of people working in the public sector contribute towards the unemployment
benefits pool. The amount of insurance sold is a solution to the following problem.
Taking qp(i) as given, bg(i) solves
max
bg(i)
λg(i)qg(i)bg(i)− [1− λg(i)]bg(i). (10)
With free entry profits are zero, hence
λg(i)qg(i)bg(i)− [1− λg(i)]bg(i) = 0. (11)
This condition implicitly clears the insurance market for each household, conditional
on not being selected in the first stage for work in the private sector.
In the next section, the equilibrium with lotteries and no insurance markets is
presented and discussed first, and then the setup is extended to incorporate a regime
with insurance.
5. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with lotteries
5.1 Definition of the DCE with lotteries
A competitive Equilibrium with sequential Lotteries for this economy is a
list
(cu(i), cp(i), cg(i), qp(i), qg(i), λp(i), λg(i), h¯p, h¯g, wp, wg, pi)
such that the following conditions are fulfilled.
1. Consumers maximization condition. Taking prices wp, wg, pi as given, for
each i, the sequence
σ = (cu(i), cp(i), cg(i), qp(i), qg(i), λp(i), λg(i))
24
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solves the maximization problem
max
σ∈Σ
q(i)
{
λp(i)
[
ln(cp) + α ln(1− h¯p)
]
+ λg(i)[1− λp(i)]
[
ln(cg) +
+α ln(1− h¯g)
]}
+ (1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)] ln(cu), (12)
where
λp(i)cp + λg(i)(1− λp(i))cg + (1− λg(i))(1− λp(i))cu =
= λp(i)wph¯p + λg(i)[1− λp(i)]wgh¯g + pi, (13)
with
cp, cg, cu ≥ 0, 0 < λp(i), λg(i) < 1, (14)
where Σ is the constraint defined by the above relations 13, 14.
2. Firm maximization condition. Taking prices wp, wg, pi as given,
max
H¯p
F (H¯p)− wpH¯p s.t. H¯p ≥ 0. (15)
3. Government sector condition. Taking prices wp, wg, pi as given, T is chosen
to balance the government budget
T = wgH¯g (16)
and
wg = γwp, (17)
Sg = S(H¯g). (18)
4. Market clearing condition. We have∫
i
λp(i)h¯pdi = H¯p (19)
∫
i
λg(i)(1− λp(i))h¯gdi = H¯g (20)
∫
i
{
λp(i)cp + λg(i)[1− λp(i)]cg + (1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)]cu
}
di = F (H¯p). (21)
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5.2 Characterizing the equilibrium
The household’s problem is as follows:
L = max
σ∈Σ
λp(i)
[
ln(cp) + α ln(1− h¯p)
]
+ λg(i)[1− λp(i)]
[
ln(cg) + α ln(1− h¯g)
]
+
+(1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)] ln(cu)− µ
[
λp(i)cp + λg(i)(1− λp(i))cg+
+(1− λg(i))(1− λp(i))cu − λp(i)wph¯p − λg(i)[1− λp(i)]wgh¯g − pi
]
,(22)
where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier in front of the households’ budget constraint.
The first-order optimality conditions are as follows:
cu :
(1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)]
cu
= µ(1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)] (23)
cp :
qλp(i)
cp
= µλp(i) (24)
cg :
λg(i)[1− λp(i)]
cg
= µλg(i)(i)[1− λp(i)]. (25)
It follows that
cu = cp = cg = 1/µ.
We simplify the Lagrangian by suppressing all consumption superscripts and i nota-
tion in the derivations to follow
λp(i) : α ln(1− h¯p)− λgα ln(1− h¯g) = −µ[wph¯p − λgwghg] (26)
λg(i) : α ln(1− h¯g) = µwgh¯g. (27)
This equation is a discrete version of the marginal product of labor equals the marginal
rate of substitution. It implicitly characterizes optimal λg.
Note that it is optimal from the benevolent planner/government point of view
to choose randomly λp and λg and to introduce uncertainty. With randomization,
choice sets are convexified, and thus market completeness is achieved. A household is
exposed to risk: first, it can be chosen to work with some probability; second, condi-
tional on not being chosen to work in the private sector, it can be picked to provide
government labor services. Given the risk in the economic environment, it would be
optimal to have insurance. The government sells employment lotteries, and individu-
als will buy insurance to cover any risk exposure. With insurance, the employer pays
wage to individuals only if they work. Now we extend the commodity space a little
26
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bit to include insurance markets explicitly.
6. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium with lotteries and insurance
markets
6.1 Definition of the equilibrium with insurance markets
A competitive Equilibrium with sequential Lotteries and insurance mar-
kets for this economy is a list
(cu(i), cp(i), cg(i), qp(i), qg(i), h¯p, h¯g, bp, bg, wp, wg, pi, λp(i), λg(i))
such that the following conditions are fulfilled.
1. Consumers maximization condition. Taking prices wp, wg, pi as given, for
each i,
σ = (cu(i), cp(i), cg(i), qp(i), qg(i), λp(i), λg(i))
solves
max
σ∈Σ
λp(i)
[
ln(cp) + α ln(1− h¯p)
]
+ λg(i)[1− λp(i)]
[
ln(cg) +
+α ln(1− h¯g)
]
+ (1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)] ln(cu) (28)
such that
cp + bpqp = wph¯p + pi (29)
cg + bgqg = bp + wgh¯g + pi (30)
cu = bg + pi (31)
cp, cq, cu ≥ 0, 0 < λp(i), λg(i) < 1. (32)
The interpretation of the constraints is as follows: In the fist stage, workers
buy unemployment insurance, while unemployed households will receive the
payout (unemployment benefits, denoted by bp). Then, conditional on not
being employed in the private sector, those households will buy public-sector
insurance (in case they are not chosen to work in the public sector), and those
27
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who remain unemployed after phase 2 will receive the payout bg. Thus, public-
sector workers need to buy two types of insurance. Also, in equilibrium, it must
be that
bp = λpwph¯p,
and
bg = (1− λp)(1− λg)wghg.
2. Firm maximization condition. Taking prices wp, wg, pi as given,
max
H¯p
F (H¯p)− wpH¯p s.t. H¯p ≥ 0. (33)
3. Government sector conditions. Taking prices wp, pi as given, T is chosen
to balance the government budget
T = wgH¯g (34)
and
wg = γwp, (35)
Sg = S(H¯g). (36)
4. Insurance company profit-maximization condition. The insurance is
sequential. In stage 1, by taking qp(i) as given, bp(i) solves
max
bp
λpqp(i)bp − (1− λp)bp, (37)
i.e. the revenue from insurance premia paid by workers who end up employed
in the private sector exceeds the total payout the insurance company makes to
the unemployed.
In the second stage, a separate insurance scheme is run among those that are
selected for private sector employment. Taking qg(i) as given, bg(i) solves
max
bg
(1− λp)λgqg(i)bg − (1− λp)(1− λg)bg (38)
i.e. the revenue if, conditional on not being employed in the private sector, an
individual is working in the public sector minus payment is s/he is not, or the
proportion of people working in the public sector and contributing towards the
benefits pool for those who are not selected for work. This implicitly clears the
insurance market for each individual.
In equilibrium, the price of insurance depends on the probability of the event
the household is insuring against. We cannot enforce
qp(i) = qp
28
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and
qg(i) = qg
although ex post (in equilibrium) that would indeed be the case. For the
insurance firm, the profits are linear in qp and qg. This implies that profits
cannot be positive or negative in equilibrium, but have to be zero. Zero profits
means that
qg =
1− λg
λg
,
and
qp =
1− λp
λp
.
A common interpretation is that for insurance companies the price of the in-
surance is the odds ratio, or the ratio of probabilities of the two events. λp and
λg are the same for all employed households.
5. Market clearing condition. We have∫
i
λp(i)h¯pdi = H¯p (39)
∫
i
λg(i)(1− λp(i))h¯gdi = H¯g (40)
∫
i
{
λp(i)cp + λg(i)[1− λp(i)]cg + (1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)]cu
}
di = F (H¯p). (41)
6.2 Characterization of the equilibrium with insurance markets
Before optimizing, we can simplify he constraint set by substituting out bg from
the budget constraint in the state the household is unemployed to obtain
bg = cu − pi. (42)
Next, plug the obtained expression in the budget constraint in the state when the
household is employed in the public sector to obtain
cg + qg(cu − pi) = bp + wgh¯g + pi. (43)
Now substitute out bp from the budget constraint in the state the household is em-
ployed in the public sector to obtain
bp = cg + qg(cu − pi)− wgh¯g − pi. (44)
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Next, plug the obtained expression in the budget constraint in the state when the
household is employed in the private sector to obtain
cp + qp[cg + qg(cu − pi)− wph¯p − pi] = wph¯p + pi. (45)
The problem now simplifies to
max
S
λp(i)
[
ln(cp) + α ln(1− h¯p)
]
+ λg(i)[1− λp(i)]
[
ln(cg) +
+α ln(1− h¯g)
]
+ (1− λg(i))[1− λp(i)] ln(cu) (46)
s.t.
cp + qp[cg + qg(cu − pi)− wph¯p − pi] = wph¯p + pi. (47)
The first-order optimality conditions are:
cp :
λp
cp
= µ (48)
cg :
λg(1− λp)
cg
= µqg (49)
cu :
(1− λp)(1− λg)
cu
= µqpqg. (50)
Since we already established that consumption will be equalized across all states, we
can obtain (divide the optimality conditions for public sector employees and unem-
ployed)
qg =
1− λg
λg
, (51)
that is, the price of insurance in the public sector is fair, that is, it equals the odds
ratio of being chosen to work in the public sector.
Similarly, divide side by side the optimality condition for private-sector employ-
ees and unemployed to obtain
qp =
1− λp
λp
, (52)
that is, the price of insurance in the private sector is also fair, as it equals the odds
ratio of being chosen to work in the private sector.
Next,
λp : ln(c) + α ln(1− h¯p)− λg[ln(c) + α ln(1− h¯g)]− (1− λg) ln(c) = 0. (53)
Hence,
α ln(1− h¯p)− λgα ln(1− h¯g) = 0 (54)
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or
λg =
ln(1− h¯p)
ln(1− h¯g) ∈ (0, 1). (55)
With the obtained value for λg we can solve for qg, and then compute λp and qp. As
we already showed, households will buy full insurance to equalize consumption in all
states. Since labor income is stochastic, i.e., it is uncertain whether the individual
will be employed in either of the two sectors, we need an institution that could offer
insurance. More specifically, sequential lotteries then can be introduced to achieve
market completeness.7
7. Conclusions
This note describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an econ-
omy with private-sector and public-sector employment. In contrast to Vasilev 2017,
2015, the public-sector labor supply decision is assumed to be a sequential one. This
requires two separate insurance market to operate, one for private-sector work, and
one for public-sector employment. In addition, given that the non-convex sectoral la-
bor choice is made in succession, the insurance market for public-sector employment
needs to open only after the insurance market for the private sector has closed, so
that in equilibrium, each household would fully insure against the emloyment status
uncertainty. This segmentation and sequentiality features of insurance markets oper-
ation is a new result and a direct consequence of both the non-convexity of the labor
supply decision and the sequential nature of the sectoral labor decision. Whether this
insurance-market sequentiality can be implemented in reality is not clear, as it would
require that not only probabilities λp and λg to be perfectly observable to everyone,
but also the winners from each lottery to be perfect knowledge. In addition, everyone
should always announce truthfully the same λp and λg to the insurance companies,
and all contracts written have to be perfectly enforceable.
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